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I. INTRODUCTION
In the abstract, the site-specific ability to issue conditional ap-
provals offers local governments the flexible option of permitting a
development proposal while simultaneously requiring the appli-
cant to offset the project's external impacts.' However, the U.S.
Supreme Court curtailed the exercise of this option in Nollan v.
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. Thank you
to J.B. Ruhl and the participants in the April 23, 2010 conference at Florida State Universi-
ty College of Law for their guidance. Further, thank you to Mark Fenster, Keith Hirokawa,
John Martinez, Jessica Owley, Andrew Schwartz, and Laura Underkuffler for providing
insightful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thank you for the observations provided by
those researchers operating under National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
award number NA100AR4170078.
1. See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and
the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 615 (2004) [hereinafter Takings Formal-
ism] ("[I]ndividualized ... exactions constitute a flexible, open-ended set of conditions that
serve regulatory and persuasive functions by offering both to internalize at least some of the
external costs of development and to make a proposed land use either sufficiently attractive
or minimally unattractive to decision makers and the voting public."). For purposes of this
Article, the term "approvals" encompasses successful applications for zoning modifications,
subdivision, variances, construction permits, and the like.
277
JOURNAL OF LAND USE
California Coastal Commission2 and Dolan v. City of Tigard3 by
establishing a constitutional takings framework unique to exaction
disputes. This exaction takings construct has challenged legal
scholars on several fronts for the better part of the past two
decades.4 For one, Nollan and Dolan place a far greater burden
on the government in justifying exactions it attaches to a develop-
ment approval than it has placed on the government in justifying
the underlying regulations by which such approval could be
withheld. Moreover, there remain a series of unanswered ques-
tions regarding the scope and reach of exaction takings scrutiny
that plague the development of a coherent body of law upon which
both landowners and regulators can comfortably rely. This Article
explores whether these problems are augmented where the exac-
tion takings construct that is ordinarily applied when an exaction
is imposed is also applicable at the point in time when an exaction
is merely proposed.
This temporal issue has received little judicial treatment to
date. Indeed, when a Florida appellate court recently faced the
question in Koontz v. St. John's River Management District,5 it had
only the cursory analysis of two lower court opinions out of Arkan-
saS6 and a dissent from the denial of certiorari at the U.S. Su-
preme Court7 on which to rely. In Koontz, a permit applicant
sought to develop protected wetlands.8 While the regulating body
could have exercised its authority to deny this request, it instead
identified several possible exactions that, if accepted by the appli-
cant, could allow for the development to proceed.9 The applicant,
however, refused these proposals, and the government ultimately
2. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
3. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
4. For a general sampling of this scholarship, see Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 473 (1991); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use
Exactions Revisited, 86 IowA L. REV. 1 (2000); Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 1;
Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts
of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007) [hereinafter Constitutional Shadow]; Mark
Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525 (2009)
[hereinafter Stubborn Incoherence); Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction
Takings, 33 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 189 (2010).
5. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Koontz IV), 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA
2009).
6. See William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark.
1990); Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
7. See Lambert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 120 S. Ct. 1549 (2000) (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J.,
& Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
8. Koontz IV 5 So. 3d at 9-10.
9. Id. (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d
1267, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).
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denied the development request outright. 0 At the appellate level,
the developer prevailed on the rather unusual theory that the gov-
ernment had proposed exactions that amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking for which compensation is due."
In an effort to situate the discussion of this proposed-versus-
imposed inquiry, Part II analyzes the contours of property's
multiple dimensions-broadly labeled by one scholar as theory,
space, stringency, and time' 2-as they arise in exaction takings
contests. It suggests that issues of temporality stand as the most
perplexing, unsettled, and multi-faceted of these dimensions.13
Nearly all takings disputes implicitly involve the temporal ques-
tion of whether, and the extent to which, property interests may be
refined in light of social, political, economic, scientific, or techno-
logical developments.14 Yet deducing property's temporal charac-
teristics also plays an important role in at least two other contexts
that are particularly relevant to the realm of exactions. First, it
establishes the relevance of the varying levels of delay between a
regulatory action and the external impact that regulation is in-
tended to cure.15 Second, it defines the point in time-be it upon
the proposition or imposition of regulatory action-when property's
other dimensions attach as to any particular takings claimant.
While the former will be addressed in a forthcoming project, this
Article focuses on the latter.
Part III starts with an examination of the limited judicial
treatment on the question of whether claimants should be entitled
to takings relief based upon the mere proposition of an exaction.
The Part then moves beyond the surface analysis in the few re-
ported decisions addressing this issue by identifying and exploring
the competing normative justifications underlying it. It offers three
10. Id. at 10 (citing Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1269).
11. Id. at 8-12 (affirming the trial court decision finding a taking). The matter is now
pending before the Florida Supreme Court. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Koontz, 15 So. 3d 581 (Fla. 2009) (granting certiorari).
12. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
15-33 (2003); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 169-82 (1996).
13. See infra notes 35-60 and accompanying text.
14. Compare Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2610 (2010) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that a judicial change in the common
law could amount to an unconstitutional taking even if that change is predictable), with
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1069-70 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("[Olur
ongoing self-education produces similar changes in the rights of property owners: New
appreciation of the significance of endangered species; the importance of wetlands; and the
vulnerability of coastal lands, shapes our evolving understandings of property rights."
(citations omitted)). For an assessment of this aspect of temporality in a recent article, see
Timothy M. Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247
(2011), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/946.pdf.
15. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Address at Albany Law School, Northeast Regional
Scholarship Workshop, Time and Exactions (Feb. 5, 2011).
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reasons to suggest that only upon the imposition of an exaction
should the existing exaction takings construct attach as to any in-
dividual permit applicant. First, where a proposed exaction is re-
fused or withdrawn, no property has been taken. 6 Second, judicial
speculation on the substantive worth of hypothetical exactions
suggests such matters are not suitable for review.'7 Third, burden-
ing governmental entities with possible takings liability for state-
ments made during pre-decisional negotiation sessions places a
chilling effect on regulator-landowner coordination. 8
Part IV contends that validating the proposed exactions theory,
as select lower courts have done, constrains governmental entities'
use of exactions as a tool responsive to the impacts associated with
the topic of this journal volume: sea level rise. Described as a
"slow-motion flood,"'9 rising waters are gradually inundating low-
lying lands and eroding beaches, such that the increased storm
surge associated therewith poses major public safety and environ-
mental risks.2o Theoretically, exactions could, at least in part,
counter these impacts. However, subjecting exactions that are
merely proposed to takings suits could depress cooperation be-
tween regulators and landowners. This, in turn, could forestall the
development of new, creative, collaborative solutions to a complex
phenomenon that both parties still do not fully understand.
The Article concludes in Part V that uncertainty remains with
respect to the temporal issue of whether the exaction takings con-
struct attaches at the moment an exaction is merely proposed.
This uncertainty is hindering the ultimate employment of exac-
16. See infra notes 132 to 136 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 137 to 149 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 150 to 156 and accompanying text.
19. Josh Harkinson, Buh Bye East Coast Beaches: Which Part of the Atlantic Coast
Will Be Swallowed By the Sea?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 27, 2010, 2:00 PM) (quoting James
Titus, EPA Project Manager for Sea Level Rise), http://motherjones.comlenvironment/
2010/04/climate-desk-sea-level-rise-epa.
20. See, e.g., Donald Scavia et al., Climate Change Impacts on U.S. Coastal and
Marine Ecosystems, 25 ESTUARIES 149, 152-53 (2002); U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM,
COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA LEVEL RISE: A FoCus ON THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION 2 (2009),
available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/sap4-1.html; J.G. TITUS, ET AL, EPA
430R07004, BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM
SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 4.1: COASTAL ELEVATIONS AND SENSITIVITY TO SEA
LEVEL RISE i (J.G. Titus & E.M. Strange, eds. 2008), available at http://epa.gov/
cimatechangeeffects/coastal/background.html; Climate Change 2007: A Synthesis Report,
IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/publicationsand datalar4/syr/en/spms3.html; JAMES G. TITUS &
vIJAY K. NARAYANAN, EPA 230-R-95-008, THE PROBABILITY OF SEA LEVEL RISE (1995),
available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastallslrmaps-probability.html; Robert J.
Nicholls et al., Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 315,
317-356 (Martin Perry et al. eds., 2007); E. ROBERT THIELER & ERIKA S. HAMMER-KLOSE,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN-FILE REPORT 00-179, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF COASTAL
vULNERABILITY TO FUTURE SEA-LEVEL RISE: PRELIMINARY RESULTS FOR THE U.S. GULF OF
MEXICO COAST (2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ofl2000/ofOO-179/index.html.
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tions as a component of local government land use controls. This
Article solicits the judiciary to provide explicit, reasoned guidance
respecting the content of the temporal characteristics of property
in exaction takings law. Until then, the discretionary governmen-
tal power to condition development approvals-particularly as a
tool to adapt to sea level rise-will continue to raise indeterminate
and unnecessary takings liability risks.
II. TEMPORALITY IN EXACTION TAKINGS LAW
This Part first suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court's exaction
takings jurisprudence provides little explicit examination of the
property interest at stake. It then explores the underlying content
of this property interest through the lens of property's multi-
dimensional features. It deduces that issues of temporality stand
as the most complicated and unsettled of these features.
A. Pricis on Nollan and Dolan
In Nollan, the state did not meet its burden of proving that a
condition requiring a beach access pathway bore an "essential
nexus" to the impacts caused by the development. 21 Dolan added
an additional requirement to Nollan's nexus test in compelling a
town to prove that the cost of dedicating a strip of land for flood
control and a public bicycle path was "rough[1y] proportion[ate]" to
the benefits the strip would provide to the public in offsetting
flooding and traffic resulting from the development. 22 Yet while the
legal validity of any takings claims depends "upon what [one] con-
sider[s] property, as a substantive matter, to be[,]" 23 neither deci-
sion proved a beacon of clarity on this score.
The impacts occasioned by the proposed development in Nollan
included blocking (1) the public's view of the ocean and (2) "the
public's sense that it may have physical access to the beach" sea-
ward of Nollan's house.24 The Court concurrently implied that the
property interest at stake was an absolute right to prohibit per-
21. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828, 837 (1987).
22. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that "the city must
make some sort of individualized determination" regarding the quantitative nature of the
condition).
23. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 18. See also Underkuffler-Freund, supra
note 12, at 165 ("Until we know what the property [interest] at stake is, it is impossible to
evaluate whether it has been taken, or whether compensation for its loss should be paid.").
24. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see C.B. MACPHERSON,
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 201 (1978) (suggesting, pre-Nollan, that
the right to exclude others is no more the essence of property than the right not to be
excluded).
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manent access by others;25 a right to prohibit temporary access by
others;26 a right to build on one's property;27 and a right to other-
wise use one's property.28 Therefore, the Court identified the par-
ticularized property interest at stake in a variety of incompatible
ways. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to hold that, by failing to
exhibit the required "essential nexus" between the end advanced
by the exaction and any justification offered for requiring a devel-
opment permit in the first place, the government "took" the prop-
erty interest at issue-whatever that property interest was.2 9
Seven years after Nollan, the Dolan majority simultaneously
avowed that the property interest at stake involved the right to
use of the entire property;30 the right to use the regulated portions
of the property;3 and the right to exclude others from the regulat-
ed portions of the property.32 After what one scholar referred to as
this "superficial glOSS" 3 3 over determining what constituted the al-
legedly taken property interest, the Court proceeded to focus on
the takings question and remanded for consideration under the
newly-established proportionality test.34
B. Characteristics of the Property Interest at Stake in
Exaction Takings Disputes
The failings of Nollan and Dolan can be illuminated with the
assistance of a model espoused by Laura Underkuffler. Underkuf-
fler asserts that property consists of four dimensions: theory,
25. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 ("an easement across their beachfront available to the
public on a permanent basis. . .').
26. Id. at 832 ("a ... continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently upon the premises") (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 833 n.2.
28. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
29. See id. at 841-42.
30. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 400 (1994).
31. Id. at 389-90.
32. Id. at 393.
33. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 154.
34. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396. On remand, even after the city no longer was asking for a
dedication of property but rather only an easement, an Oregon trial court concluded that the
city could not meet its burden under the "rough proportionality" test. The parties ultimately
resolved the matter via settlement, with the city agreeing to pay Dolan nearly $1.5 million
for the relevant strip of property. Randall T. Shephard, Takings Law: Do We Really Want
More Judicial Intervention in State Land Use Regulation?, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 102
n.22 (2002) (citing City of Tigard Will Pay Dolans $ 1.5 Million in Bikepath 'Takings" Case,
BUS. WIRE, Nov. 21, 1997); Richard Duane Faus, Exactions, Impacts Fees, and
Dedications-Local Government Responses to Nollan/Dolan Takings Law Issues, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 675, 676-77 (2000); Samuel H. Weissbard & Camellia K Schuk, Taking Issue with
Taking by Regulation, COM. INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE (Nov. - Dec. 1998), available at
http://www.ccim.com/cire-magazine/articles/taking-issue-taking-regulation; Dolan v. Tigard:
Owner Gets $1.4 Million From City--at Last!, REALTOR MAG., (July 1, 1998), available at
http://www.realtor.org/archives/lawyoujull998b.
[Vol. 26:2282
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space, stringency, and time. The theoretical dimension involves a
decision reflecting the incidents of ownership.35 The spatial dimen-
sion identifies those "objects," or types of interests, to which the
chosen theory of rights applies.36 The stringency dimension relates
to the level of protection afforded to the identified private interest
in light of competing societal interests.37 And the temporal dimen-
35. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 16. This dimension requires a universal
theory of individual rights (lest any idea of property be void of meaning). See also Susan
Eisenberg, Comment, Intangible Takings, 60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 702-03 (2007) (discussing
the role of a universal theory for defining property rights). Such a theory could, for instance,
be grounded in positivist notions of the law, historical understandings, ordinary meaning,
custom, or reasonable and justified expectations. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 19-
21. See also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A Renewed
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1239 n.9 (2005); Joseph William Singer,
The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations,
30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 310-14 (2006) (describing conceptions of what "ownership"
means to partially define property rights).
36. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 21 ("If we choose, for example, the property
holder's 'reasonable expectations' as the theoretical dimension for our conception of proper-
ty, the question arises: 'reasonable expectations with respect to what?' If we choose legal
rules as the theoretical dimension for our conception of property, the question arises: 'legal
rules as applied to what?"'). Underkuffler contends that the spatial dimension is relevant on
both a conceptual and a geographic scale. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 12, at 171
("The chosen theory of rights has meaning only with reference to a geographically or other-
wise conceptually described field of application."). The "parcel as a whole" debate in regula-
tory takings jurisprudence provides an appropriate example on the geographic scale. See
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ('"Taking' jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. ... [T]his Court focus-
es . . . on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole ...
."); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (supporting
the statement in Penn Central that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action
is measured against the value of the parcel as a whole); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002) (quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31)
("in regulatory takings cases [the judiciary] must focus on 'the parcel as a whole"'). But see
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (declar-
ing the relevant parcel to be the 50.7 regulated acres rather than the entire 311.7 acre par-
cel owned by the plaintiff); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that the relevant parcel for takings purposes did not include por-
tions of the parcel sold before promulgation of the regulation at issue). See also Marc R.
Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 93, 110 n.65
(2002) [hereinafter Virtue of Vagueness] ("In a takings claim based on loss of value, the loss
must be examined relative to a 'before' picture of what was initially at stake."); James G.
Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and
Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1348 (1998) ("A setback of
one foot ... might deny all beneficial use to that first foot of land, yet barely impair the use
of the remaining land.").
37. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 25. For example, the Supreme Court, having on
several occasions chosen a theory of rights grounded in the "bundle of rights" metaphor, has
categorized the "right to exclude" as "one of the most essential sticks" in that bundle. Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). Necessarily, then, there must be sticks
within that bundle that are afforded a lesser degree of protection than the right to exclude.
See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 25. Indeed, the Court in another case seemingly
acknowledged the same, stating that an ordinance limiting land to single-family dwellings
does not "extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership[.]" Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80). Outside of the real property
context, the stringency with which property rights are protected also might differ depending
upon the kinds of objects at issue. For example, money is less protected than real property
283
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sion, according to Underkuffler, reflects whether, and the extent to
which, property rights can be modified in light of evolutional socie-
tal change.38 If courts directly contemplate the choices they are
making within each dimension, their holdings are more likely to
seem principled. 39 In other words, attentiveness to these four di-
mensions of property forces the judiciary to acknowledge at least
some of the underlying choices made in takings cases. 40 However,
in both of its seminal exaction takings decisions, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not overtly acknowledge the content ascribed to each
dimension of the property interest that it deemed taken.
It appears that, in Nollan, the Court simultaneously selected
two distinct theories of rights, without delineating the contours of
either theory or suggesting how any distinctions between the two
might be reconciled. First, it chose a theory of property as circum-
scribed by its "ordinary meaning."4' However, the Court only ex-
plicitly defined "ordinary meaning" in the negative; it stated that
"ordinary meaning" does not connote the landowner's reasonable
expectations with respect to use restrictions, as Justice Brennan
had defined it in a dissenting opinion.42 Second, the Court resorted
in light of its fungible nature. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 555 (1998) (Breyer,
J., dissenting); United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9 (1989). It also may differ
in light of the different contexts in which ownership rights to a given object appear. For
example, a chair with which one has a personal attachment because it is a family heirloom
may be more protected than the same chair-from a physical standpoint-that is
replaceable with one of equal value. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 27 (citing Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN L. REV. 957, 1007 (1982)).
38. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 29-30. If one chooses a theory of rights
grounded in ordinary meaning, however, it is difficult to distinguish Underkuffler's
description of the theoretical dimension with that of the temporal dimension. This Article
suggests that the temporal nature of property, particularly in exaction takings cases,
consists of several important sub-elements that separate it from choices surrounding a
theory of rights. See infra text accompanying notes 58-60.
39. It suffices to say that the more the content afforded each dimension of such
choices is made transparent, the better off all members of society will be-from judges to
legislators to regulators to private citizens-in fashioning their own perspectives on the
competing interests at work in takings disputes. Without an explicit assessment of the
content of each dimension, individuals "lose the opportunity to evaluate consciously the
social and political choices that all property involves." UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 62
(comparing a conception of property that recognizes competing interests amidst a fluid
landscape and "explicitly assess[es]" the "choices for its dimensions of theory, space,
stringency, and time" with a conception of property that views property as "protection" and
"tends to deny or obscure these [dimensional] choices" without asking "why or how such
protection exists"). This lost opportunity supports a "dangerous (and naive) illusion that
protection of property is 'impartial' in nature ..... Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 12, at
202.
40. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 155 ("Awareness of the dimensions that
property involves would . . . force an awareness of the choices that we-as a society-are
making in [takings] cases, either explicitly or by default.").
41. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
42. Id.
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to a theory of rights grounded in the "bundle of rights" metaphor.4 3
The Dolan majority cited favorably to the Court's earlier reliance
on this metaphor, without further explanation. 44 Yet while the
Court has previously held that the "bundle" includes the generally-
described rights of possession, use, exclusion, and disposition,45
the "sticks" that make up this bundle have been so vociferously
debated that some suggest the metaphor is of trivial meaning. 46
Complicating Nollan's, and, by affirmation, Dolan's, rather
perplexing selection of the "ordinary meaning" and "bundle of
rights" theories, the U.S. Supreme Court in other recent takings
cases has chosen theories grounded in the right to "anticipated
gains,"47 the right to use as limited by background principles of
state property law,48 and the rights as determined by the "existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law[.]" 49
Similarly, the Court has not definitely interpreted the spatial
dimension of property rights in the exactions context. Rather, it
has sent only vague signals in identifying the categories of
exactions to which the Nollan and Dolan paradigm apply. Several
commentators have drawn from dicta in recent Supreme Court
decisions to suggest that the relevant "space" includes only those
exactions that are adjudicative in nature50 or require public occu-
43. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982)). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion suggested the same. See id. at 857 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[S]tate law is the source of those strands that constitute a property owner's
bundle of . .. rights.").
44. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
45. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). See also
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 12, at 169 ("Theories that have appeared, at various times
[in U.S. Supreme Court opinions], include the 'bundle' of 'traditionally' or 'commonly'
recognized rights to possess, use, transport, sell, donate, exclude, or devise[.]"(footnote
omitted)).
46. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution
of Property Law, Culture, and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1701626.
47. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). See also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
528-29 (1998).
48. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
49. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
50. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 628 (citing City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)) (suggesting that dicta in Del
Monte Dunes "seemed to limit nexus and proportionality to a subset of land use conditions"
that are adjudicative in nature); Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness, supra note 36, 107 n.55 (con-
tending that Del Monte Dunes limits the application of Nollan and Dolan to individualized
determinations); Robert H. Freilich & Jason M. Divelbiss, The Public Interest is Vindicated:
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 31 URB. LAW. 371, 380 (1999) (suggesting that Del
Monte Dunes establishes that the Nollan and Dolan threshold is limited to "the [n]arrow
[c]ategorical [e]xceptions of [t]itle or [e]xaction [t]akings"); Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction
Takings, supra note 4, at 212-14 (suggesting that there is a strong implication in the U.S.
Supreme Court's unanimous 2005 opinion in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528
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pation of private lands.5' (Both the beach access way exaction in
Nollan and the bicycle path exaction in Dolan were arguably
adjudicative, 52 and both clearly required public occupation of
previously private lands.) Yet other commentators suggest that the
nexus and proportionality threshold is equally applicable to
legislatively-imposed exactions,53 or to exactions that do not re-
(2005) that the Nollan and Dolan tests do not apply to conditions imposed through the legis-
lative process).
51. As with the adjudicative-versus-legislative distinction, some scholars contend that
there is a strong implication in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle that the Nollan and Dolan tests
do not apply to conditions that are not physically invasive. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings For-
malism, supra note 1, at 635-36; John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV.
1047, 1077-79 (2000) [hereinafter Takings and Errors]; John D. Echeverria, Revving the
Engines in Neutral: City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 29 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10682, 10692 (1999); Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 4, at 214.
52. But see Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 4, at 227 (suggesting
that both Nollan and Dolan could be considered generally applicable legislative schemes,
whereby the facts in those cases would fail to meet the stated circumstances in which their
tests apply).
53. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use
Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10100, 10103-05 (2000) ("It seems highly unlikely that the
Supreme Court would unanimously declare through dicta in Del Monte Dunes that the
Dolan 'rough proportionality' principle should not develop to meet the exigencies of cases as
they arise, much less to deal with deliberate municipal circumventions."); J. David Breemer,
The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus'" How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan
and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 401-02
(2002); Christopher T. Goodin, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction Between
Administrative and Legislative Exactions: 'A Distinction Without A Constitutional
Difference," 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 158-67 (2005); David L. Callies & Christopher T.
Goodin, The Status of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard
After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539, 563-64 (2007); Steven A.
Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal-Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB.
LAW. 487, 501-21 (2006) (arguing that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between
branches of government, such that legislative and adjudicative exactions should receive the
same level of judicial scrutiny); James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of
Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 397, 407-17 (2009) (arguing that Lingle supports subjecting legislatively-
imposed exactions to heightened judicial scrutiny).
For a review of the pre-Lingle judicial split on this issue of legislative versus
adjudicative exactions, compare Garneau v. City of Seattle, 147 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir.
1998) (expressing "considerable doubt" about the applicability of Dolan's rough
proportionality standard to "legislative, as opposed to administrative exactions") (footnote
omitted), San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105-11 (Cal.
2002) (holding that Nollan and Dolan's heightened scrutiny did not apply to broad
legislation establishing a formula for housing replacement fee conditions), Homebuilders
Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Tualatin Hills Park & Rec. Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 413 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test did not apply in determining
whether system development charge was a taking), Home Builders Ass'n. of Cent. Ariz. v.
City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 1997), Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of
Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), Southeast Cass Water Res. Dist.
v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 527 N.W.2d 884, 896 (N.D. 1995), Waters Landing L.P. v.
Montgomery Cnty., 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994), and Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 450 So. 2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994), with Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661
N.E.2d 380, 389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (applying Dolan to legislatively imposed property
development conditions), Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(distinguishing a legislatively adopted exaction scheme where the ordinance grants
discretion to the county to determine the extent of the exaction, to which Nollan and Dolan
apply, from a legislatively determined impact fee charge, to which they do not), and Lincoln
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quire physical public occupation, such as conservation restrictions
and impact fees.54
City Chamber of Commerce v. City of Lincoln City, 991 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(applying Dolan to an ordinance requiring fees for roads and other infrastructure as
development permit conditions). Of note, Justices O'Connor and Thomas dissented from the
U.S. Supreme Court's denial of a petition for certiorari in a matter where the Georgia
Supreme Court declared that the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is not applicable
to legislatively-imposed exactions, but only those that are adjudicatively-imposed. See
Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1117-19 (1995) (Thomas, J. &
O'Connor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
For post-Lingle cases on this legislative versus adjudicative question, compare Wolf
Ranch L.L.C. v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 880 (Colo. App. 2008), affd, 220 P.3d
559 (Colo. 2009) (holding that legislatively formulated exactions applying to broad classes of
landowners do not require a showing of an essential nexus and rough proportionality), and
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Nollan
and Dolan tests are inapplicable to cases that do not involve individual, adjudicative
decisions nor the physical appropriation of private land), with B.A.M. Dev. L.L.C. v. Salt
Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1170-71 (Utah 2006) (holding that prior to the enactment of a
Utah statute codifying a "rough proportionality" treatment of all development exactions,
Nollan and Dolan applied to both adjudicative decisions and general land-use ordinances).
54. See, e.g., Breemer, supra note 53, at 402-05. The lower courts continue to debate
the issue. For pre-Lingle cases on this question, compare Kitt v. United States, 277 F.3d
1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d.
1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) ('"the mere imposition of an obligation to pay money . . . does
not give rise to a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment"'), Garneau, 147
F.3d at 811 (expressing "considerable doubt" about the applicability of Dolan's rough
proportionality standard to "fee exactions, as opposed to physical exactions"), Clajon Prod.
Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 1995) (declaring that Dolan's heightened
scrutiny is inapplicable to fees imposed as a condition of a landowner's exercise of her
property rights to hunt on her own land because no physical occupation occurred), Atlas
Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 757-758 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)) (conditioning approval on
expenditures is not a taking), Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 1000 (citing
Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)) (finding a water resource
development fee not subject to Dolan's heightened scrutiny), and McCarthy v. City of
Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (declining to apply Dolan beyond property
dedications to impact fees), with Garneau, 147 F.3d at 815 n.5 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994))
(asserting that U.S. Supreme Court's vacation and remand in Ehrlich soon after Dolan
suggests Dolan applies to imposed fees), Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P.,
135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004) (applying Dolan to traffic impact fee imposed ad hoc to
improve an existing public road), Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695
(Colo. 2001) (applying Dolan to sanitation fee), Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,
444 (Cal. 1996) (applying Dolan to recreation fee), N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. Cnty. of
DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 390-91 (111. 1995) (applying Dolan to transportation impact fees),
Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (applying Dolan to park
fees), Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. App. 1999)
(deciding that Nollan and Dolan apply "where the City requires the developer as a condition
of approval to incur substantial costs improving an adjoining street"), J.C. Reeves Corp. v.
Clackamas Cnty., 887 P.2d 360, 365-66 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (applying Dolan to
transportation impact fees), and Dowerk v. Charter Twp. of Oxford, 592 N.W.2d 724, 728
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (applying Dolan to extension and upgrade of private roads).
For post-Lingle cases on this question, compare Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d
1081, 1089-90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that that Nollan and Dolan only apply to permit
conditions that require a physical invasion of property), and City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126
P.3d 802, 808 (Wash. 2006) (holding that the tests applied in Nollan and Dolan should not
be extended to impact fees imposed to mitigate the direct impacts of new development or
general growth impact fees imposed pursuant to statutorily-authorized ordinances), with
Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass'n v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 449-
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In analyzing Nollan and Dolan, one can say with certainty that
only the stringency dimension of property has been explicitly ad-
dressed in any detail. Whatever theory of rights is utilized, in
whatever conceptual space those rights apply, the judiciary is to
review any alleged infringement of those rights via an exaction
with an intermediate level of scrutiny. That is, the government
bears the burden of establishing compliance with the "essential
nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests.55 And even within the
stringency dimension, the precise nature of the nexus and propor-
tionality tests remains subject to debate.
50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that under California law, the Nollan and Dolan tests apply
to permit conditions that require land dedication and ad hoc mitigation fees).
Some commentators even have contended that the Nollan and Dolan opinions indicate
the Court's willingness to authorize an expanded field of substantive challenges to the
validity of final governmental acts far beyond exactions. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Takings
and Causation, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 359, 377-78 (1997) (suggesting that the Nollan
and Dolan analysis should apply to all governmental actions that affect private property
interests); Edward J. Sullivan, Substantive Due Process Resurrected through the Takings
Clause: Nollan, Dolan, and Ehrlich, 25 ENVTL. L. 155 (1995). But see Richard J. Ansson, Jr.,
Dolan v. Tigard's Rough Proportionality Standard: Why This Standard Should Not Be
Applied to an Inverse Condemnation Claim Based upon Regulatory Denial, 10 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 417, 425-434 (2000).
55. For scholarly articles referring to the Nollan and Dolan threshold as a form of "in-
termediate scrutiny," see, for example, Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and
Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1516-17 (2006) (discuss-
ing academic debate on the benefits and burdens of applying the intermediate scrutiny re-
quired by Nollan and Dolan to exactions); Note, California Court of Appeal Finds Nollan's
and Dolan's Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Inclusionary Zoning Ordinance.-Home
Builders Ass'n of Northern California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2058, 2058-59 (2002) (discussing a California Court of Appeal's
refusal to apply intermediate scrutiny in accordance with Nollan and Dolan to exactions in
support of inclusionary zoning); Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The
Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2184-87 (2002) (suggesting
that, in Nollan and Dolan, the Rehnquist Court, "lowered the bar . .. for private property
owners challenging government regulation of land" by calling for a more significant level of
scrutiny than had previously been required in land use cases and placing the burden of
proof on the defendant government); Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 622
("Nollan's and Dolan's 'essential nexus' and 'rough proportionality' tests require courts to
apply heightened scrutiny to challenged land use regulations"); Breemer, supra note 53, at
385 (citing Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (1996)) (discussing the need for
application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the Court in Nollan and
Dolan to curtail the government's abusive use of its discretionary land use and police pow-
ers); Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard on
Local Governments' Land-Use Powers, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 219 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (stating
that Nollan and Dolan "clearly signalled the Court's determination to provide greater pro-
tection for private property rights" through the application of intermediate judicial scruti-
ny); Andrew W. Schwartz, Deputy City Attorney, S.F., Cal., Address at Georgetown Univ.
Law Ctr., Litigating Regulatory Takings Claims: The Application of Nollan/Dolan Height-
ened Scrutiny to Legislative Regulations and "Unsuccessful Exactions," (Oct. 28-29, 1999);
Donald C. Guy & James E. Holloway, The Direction of Regulatory Takings Analysis in the
Post-Lochner Era, 102 DICK. L. REV. 327, 346 (1998) (stating the Court's nexus and propor-
tionality tests represent the application of heightened judicial scrutiny). See also STEVEN J.
EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 7-10(b)(7) (3d ed. 2005).
PROPOSED EXACTIONS
Openly affording content-imprecise at that-to but one of
the first three dimensions of the property interest at stake in
exaction takings disputes hardly establishes a coherent and con-
sistent paradigm in which regulators and individual property own-
ers can be expected to comfortably co-exist. 56 Not surprisingly, the
content afforded by the Supreme Court to these first three dimen-
sions has provoked a significant amount of critical legal scholar-
ship.57 However, the temporal dimension has gone largely unde-
tected within exactions jurisprudence, and, likely as a result,
has not been fully explored in the academic literature. In this
light, it is the temporal features of property to which the remain-
der of this Article is dedicated.
The content afforded the temporal dimension is important on
several fronts. As Underkuffler suggests, it affects whether, and
the extent to which, property interests may be refined in light of
subsequent collective action responsive to political, economic, sci-
entific, or technological developments.58 Yet decisions respecting
property's temporal characteristics also play an important role in
at least two other contexts in exaction taking law. First, defining
property's temporal features establishes the relevance of the vary-
ing levels of delay between an exaction and the external impact
that exaction is intended to cure.59 Second, it determines the point
in time when property's theoretical, spatial, and stringency
characteristics attach as to any particular exaction takings
claimant.60 The following Part considers this latter element of
property's temporal dimension.
III. PROPOSED-VERSUS-IMPOSED EXACTIONS
The first section below explores the limited judicial treatment
on the temporal question of whether the Nollan and Dolan
construct attaches at a point in time prior to the government's
imposition of an exaction. The second section goes beyond
the cursory analysis in these reported decisions by exploring
56. See, e.g., Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness, supra note 36, at 107 n.55 (suggesting that
Nollan and Dolan articulate tests "that are hardly beacons of clarity. . ."); Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note 1, at 613-14, 628 (describing Nollan and Dolan as "somewhat
inexact" and contending that "state and lower federal courts lack guidance on, and continue
to disagree about, the precise boundaries of the category of regulations to which the
exactions rules apply").
57. See, e.g., supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
58. See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 29-30. See also supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
59. See Mulvaney, Time and Exactions, supra note 15.
60. See infra notes 61-169 and accompanying text.
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the competing normative positions pertinent to resolution of this
temporal question.
A. The Limited Judicial Treatment of the
Proposed- Versus-Imposed Exaction Inquiry
The factual circumstances of St. John's River Management Dis-
trict v. Koontz, 61 recently decided by a Florida appellate court,
serve as an appropriate template to explore this temporal element.
Coy Koontz applied to the St. Johns River Management District
(the "District") for a dredge-and-fill permit to construct a commer-
cial shopping center on 3.7 acres of his 14.2-acre lot.62 The permit
was necessary because nearly Koontz's entire property lies within
the Riparian Habitat Protection Zone of the Econlockhatchee River
Hydrologic Basin ("Basin").63 Koontz's proposed development with-
in the Basin would require the destruction of 3.4 acres of protected
wetlands and 0.3 acres of protected uplands.64 In his development
application, Koontz offered to mitigate the wetland loss
by restricting from development the remaining undeveloped por-
tion of the largely wetland property (a total of 10.5 acres) through
a conservation easement.65
In assessing the District's response to Koontz's permit applica-
tion, it is important to identify the baseline: the District at
all times retained the regulatory authority to prohibit use of
the property to protect the health and safety of the public by pre-
serving the ecosystem services that Koontz's property, in its
natural state, provides.66 In this instance, however, the District
proved willing to discuss possible avenues for mitigating the
impacts of the proposed development through imposition of an
exaction.67 Yet Koontz's mitigation proposal (placing a conserva-
61. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
62. Id. at 9-10. Technically, Koontz applied for both a dredge-and-fill permit and "a
management and storage of surface waters permit . . . ." Id. at 10 (citing Koontz II, 861 So.
2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). The distinction between the two is not relevant to the
issues addressed herein.
63. Id. at 9-10.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 9-10. There is no mention in the public record of Koontz offering to offset the
loss of protected uplands, nor of the government requesting that Koontz do so.
66. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Koontz Ill), 720 So. 2d 560, 561
(Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (affirming the District's statutory authority to designate the affected
land as a protected hydrological basin). For examples of prominent scholarship on the
emerging notion of ecosystem services, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy
Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L 157 (2007), and Keith H.
Hirokawa, Three Stories About Nature: Property, the Environment, and Ecosystem Services,
62 MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1809035.
67. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 10.
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tion restriction on the 10.5 acres upon which he did not propose to
build) amounted to less than one-third of that required by the Dis-
trict's conservation guidelines.68
In informal discussions with Koontz, the District stated that it
was willing to grant the development permit on the condition that
Koontz perform offsite mitigation.69 For example, the District sug-
gested that Koontz agree to plug ditches, replace damaged cul-
verts, or perform some equivalent mitigating act on nearby proper-
ties within the Basin.70 Alternatively, the District proposed that
Koontz could avoid performing any off-site wetlands mitigation by
reducing the size of his project to the point where the destruction
of protected territory would be limited to one acre.71
Koontz rejected these propositions by the District;72 he would
only agree to his original, self-proposed condition to deed-restrict
the remaining portion of his property for conservation purposes
after construction of his entire 3.7-acre proposed development.73
Concluding that Koontz's self-proposed condition would not
offset the wetland loss associated with the project, the District
denied the permit application outright.74 In the denial order,
the District reiterated its suggested mitigation options, as well
as the project design alternative, that would make Koontz's
development permissible.75
68. Petitioner-Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits, at 2, Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8
(SCO9-713), 2009 WL 4227381 (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The District's mitigation guidelines call for a 10:1
mitigation ratio. Id. at 7-8. It is questionable whether these guidelines-or at least St.
Johns' application of them-are sufficiently protective of wetland resources under Florida's
Environmental Resource Permitting Program, which states that "[t]he mitigation must
offset the adverse effects caused by the regulated activity." FIA. STAT. § 373.414(1)(b)
(2010). Existing law prohibits the destruction of wetlands, yet St. Johns apparently
contends that its guidelines allow a developer to destroy one acre of wetlands he owns for
every ten acres of wetlands he owns but does not destroy. To actually offset the destruction
of one wetland acre (upon which development is otherwise prohibited), it seems more
appropriate that the government demand that an applicant create a certain multiple
number of acres of new wetlands (based on the likelihood of their surviving the tenuous
process of converting uplands to wetlands), restore degraded wetlands, enhance the
functionality of existing wetlands, or place a conservation restriction on upland wetlands
buffers or wetlands that for some reason are not protected by existing law. See generally
Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 1043 (2006); David C. Levy & Jessica Owley Lippmann, Preservation as Mitigation
under CEQA Ho-hum or Uh-oh?, 14 ENvTL. L. NEWS 18 (2005).
72. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 10. See also id. at 16 (Griffin, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Koontz
apparently thought [development of 3.7 acres, preservation of the balance, and offsite
mitigation to enhance existing wetlands by cleaning some culverts and ditches] was OK,
except for the part about the culverts and ditches . . . ").
73. Id. at 10 (citing Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).
74. See id.
75. Petitioner-Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits, at 2-4.
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Koontz did not seek an administrative hearing to question the
validity of the proposed mitigation demands, as authorized under
Florida's Administrative Procedure Act.7 6 Instead, he filed suit in
the State's circuit court under the rather unusual theory that the
District had proposed conditions that amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking for which compensation would be due.7 7
Before trial, the parties stipulated that the denial order did not
deprive Koontz "of all or substantially all economically [viable] ...
use of [his] property."78 In light of this stipulation, Koontz neces-
sarily retained property that was economically valuable and avail-
able for certain non-trivial uses.79 Therefore, Koontz would be
highly unlikely to prevail under the "essentially ad hoc" balancing
test set forth in Penn Central that is ordinarily applicable in regu-
latory takings cases.80 The question that remained is one of a tem-
76. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b) (2010). At such an administrative hearing,
environmental organizations and other interested parties have standing to participate in
the scientific, procedural, and policy questions surrounding issues such as wetlands
mitigation. See id. However, such groups are not afforded the same participatory rights in
civil actions, such as the one that Koontz pursued here. See, e.g., Racing Props., L.P., v.
Baldwin, 885 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). See also McMahon v. Geldersma, 317
S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., 34
S.W.3d 122, 127 (Mo. 2000)) ("In the absence of a statute conferring an unconditional right
to intervene, an applicant seeking intervention must file a timely motion showing three
elements: '(1) an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action; (2) that the applicant's ability to protect the interest is impaired or impeded; and (3)
that the existing parties are inadequately representing the applicant's interest."'); In re
Devon Energy Prod. Co., 321 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re Union
Carbide Corp. 273 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. 2008)) ("To constitute a justiciable interest, the
intervenor's interest must be such that if the original action had never been commenced,
and he had first brought it as the sole plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover in his
own name to the extent of at least a part of the relief sought in the original suit.").
77. See Koontz III, 720 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
78. Petitioner-Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits, at 4-5 (citation omitted).
79. Koontz originally contended that the government's proposed exactions "did not
serve a substantial purpose[,]" were "so excessive" and "[un]necessary[,]" and "without
basis." Joint Pre-Trial Statement at 7 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Aug.
2002) (No. C1-94-5763) (on file with author). He grounded these contentions in the U.S.
Supreme Court's test, announced in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), that a regulatory
decision that fails to "substantially advance" a legitimate state interest amounts to an
unconstitutional taking. Petitioner-Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits at 30. However, a
unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Agins test as an appropriate takings inquiry in
2005, suggesting it instead sounds in due process. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 540 (2005). While the exactions tests of Nollan and Dolan seemingly required
application of the very substantive analysis rejected in Lingle, Lingle preserved Nollan and
Dolan's tests in the "special context" of exactions. Id. at 538, 548. Apparently, after Lingle,
Koontz successfully converted his claim to fit the high court's salvaged exaction takings
jurisprudence. This mid-litigation conversion is fodder for additional future scholarship. For
general assessments of Lingle's impact upon exaction takings jurisprudence, see John D.
Echeverria, Lingle Etc., The U.S. Supreme Court's Takings Trilogy, 35 ELR 10577 (2005);
Fenster, Stubborn Incoherence, supra note 4; Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings,
supra note 4.
80. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that, where facing a traditional regulatory
takings claim, courts must engage in an "essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" by
considering the degree to which the claimant's property interest is impaired, the import of
the interest advanced by the government's regulatory act, and the fairness in asking the
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poral nature: is the Penn Central balancing inquiry supplanted by
the more probing scrutiny of the U.S. Supreme Court's exaction
takings jurisprudence at the point in time where the government
offers mitigation options before ultimately issuing a denial? An-
swering this question in the affirmative would mean that the theo-
retical, spatial, and stringency features of property attach as to
any particular owner at the instant of the proposed exactions. In
Koontz's case, this would obviously improve his chances of prevail-
ing, for he could avail himself of the "intermediate scrutiny" of the
Nollan and Dolan test, instead of the lower level of scrutiny of a
Penn Central analysis.81
Nearly all of the many lower court applications of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's exaction takings construct have addressed final
permit approvals.82 Indeed, prior to Koontz, it appears that in only
three instances-a federal district court opinion, a federal circuit
court opinion, and in a U.S. Supreme Court Justice's dissent from
a denial of certiorari-did members of the judiciary assert that a
proposed exaction could, in and of itself, implicate the Takings
Clause. 83 And across these three cases, the opinions provide thin
claimant to bear this burden rather than the public); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538
U.S. 216, 233-35 (2003) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124) ("Our regulatory takings
jurisprudence ... is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries' .... ); Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001). See also Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note
1, at 612 ("The general default standard that applies to the majority of takings claims . . .
employs a relatively low level of scrutiny and balances a number of factors in an ad hoc,
open-ended inquiry.").
81. Still, it is unclear whether the stringency of the nexus and proportionality tests
applies within the space that Koontz asserts, namely, on-site conservation and the funding
of off-site mitigation. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
82. For a sampling of the most recent reported exaction takings cases that have
received attention in the academic literature, all of which involve the issuance of conditional
permits, see McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008); Norman v. United
States, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P., 135
S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); Wolf Ranch L.L.C. v. City of Colo. Springs, 207 P.3d 875 (Colo. App.
2008), aff'd, 220 P.3d 559; Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass'n v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
83. An amici of Koontz, in its brief to the Florida Supreme Court, submitted without
explanation that there are four additional cases on point supportive of answering this
question in the affirmative. See Brief of Fla. Home Builders Ass'n & Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 10-11, Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8 (SC09-713)
2010 WL 262547. However, each of the four appears inapposite. The first, decided before
Nollan and Dolan, involved only a facial challenge to an ordinance, from which the
applicant had received a variance. Lee Cnty. v. New Testament Baptist, 507 So. 2d 626, 627
(Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In the second, a court applied Nollan where the government issued an
order stating that if the developer did not submit a sufficient alternative re-design plan, the
developer's road access permit would be issued with a condition requiring a public access
easement across his property. Paradyne Corp. v. Fla. Dept. of Transp., 528 So. 2d 921, 926-
27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). In the third case, a state appellate court in Illinois held that the
denial of an application to expand a gas station was substantively invalid; therefore, the
court's discussion of whether the dedication that the city would have attached to an issued
permit was dicta. Amoco Oil Co. v. Vili. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 391 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) ("[T]he very issue in this case is whether [the city] has in fact enacted a valid special
use permit."). And in the fourth, Salt Lake County had not only proposed an exaction but
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and contradictory guidance on the complex questions surrounding
whether such a novel claim presents a legitimate takings issue.
In one case, William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort
Smith," the City of Fort Smith advised a developer seeking to
build a convenience store that it could not authorize the proposed
construction unless the developer granted the city an expanded
right-of-way along the street frontage of his property for traffic and
safety purposes.85 In ruling for the developer, then-U.S. District
Court Judge Morris Arnold (and current judge on the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals) cited to what he termed "a brilliantly sus-
tained and intellectually unrelenting elaboration of the relation-
ship between the Fifth Amendment and taxes" by noted libertarian
scholar Richard Epstein.86
Judge Arnold accepted that the development would result in an
increase in traffic into and out of the relevant property.87 However,
drawing on Epstein's work, he likened the city's dedication propo-
sition to a tax.88 He held that the city did not prove that any over-
all traffic increase, as opposed to a mere redistribution of traffic,
would result from the proposed development.89 He declared that
this governmental action thus amounted to an exaction taking un-
der Nollan's nexus standard.90 Judge Arnold ordered the city "to
issue the requested permit unconditionally."91
A second case, Goss v. City of Little Rock,92 involved factual cir-
cumstances quite similar to William J. Jones Insurance Trust. The
federal district court ruled that the city's denial of a rezoning re-
quest-in light of the applicant's refusal to dedicate a portion of his
property for highway expansion as a condition thereto-amounted
to an exaction taking in violation of the Nollan and Dolan thresh-
old.93 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.94
issued a conditional permit. See B.A.M. Dev. L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1164
(Utah 2006).
84. 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
85. Id. at 913.
86. Id. at 914 n.2.
87. Id. at 914.
88. Id. See also Nancy E. Stroud & Susan L. Trevarthen, Defensible Exactions After
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 STETSON L. REV.
719, 764-65 (1996) (remarking that, although Judge Arnold admitted that the increased
carloads on the applicant's property could increase congestion, he suggested that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that the development would not create the congestion
but only relocate it). Takings scholar Steven Eagle has described Judge Arnold's opinion on
this point as "well-reasoned" and "prescient" in advance of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Dolan, which came four years after William J. Jones Ins. Trust. EAGLE, supra
note 55, at § 7-10(a)(1).
89. See William J. Jones Ins. Trust, 731 F. Supp. at 914.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 863.
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But Goss is a peculiar holding, for the court stated, "Little Rock
has a legitimate interest in declining to rezone Goss's property,
and the city may pursue that interest by denying Goss's rezoning
application outright, as opposed to denying it because of Goss's re-
fusal to agree to an unconstitutional condition . . . ."95 Thus, the
court said that a taking occurred, but no remedy-compensation or
otherwise-was due.96 In light of the Eighth Circuit's decision on
the remedy in Goss eight years after William J. Jones Insurance
Trust, as well as recent U.S. Supreme Court case law indicating
that equitable relief is not appropriate in takings cases,9 7 the con-
tinuing precedential value of Judge Arnold's decision in William J.
Jones Insurance Trust is in some doubt.
At issue in a third case, Lambert v. City and County of San
Francisco,98 were two measures taken by the City of San Francisco
to counter the diminishing supply of affordable housing and the
corrosion of the character of mixed-use neighborhoods that were
resulting from tourism generation. 99 First, the City amended its
Planning Code and Master Plan to prohibit the employ of residen-
tial units for commercial uses except upon approval of a condition-
al use permit application.100 Second, it adopted the Residential Ho-
tel Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance ("HUCDO"). Inde-
pendent of the restrictions in the Planning Code and the Master
Plan, the HUCDO requires conditioning the conversion of residen-
tial units to tourism units on the provision of either a one-to-one
94. Id.
95. Id. at 864.
96. Id. at 866. See also David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court:
How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What
State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 570-71 n.309 (1999)
("[w]hile finding the highway dedication a taking, the court held the city could avoid any
takings claims by simply refusing to rezone the subject property without the invalid
dedication, pursuing its legitimate interest in declining to rezone property").
97. See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (asserting that the
validity of government action is a due process inquiry that necessarily is precedent to a
takings analysis, for "[n]o amount of compensation can authorize such action."). But see Stop
the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2607 (2010)
(plurality opinion) (asserting there is "no reason why [compensation] would be the exclusive
remedy for a ... taking."). The lone court to face the remedies question since Stop the Beach
Renourishment rejected as dictum the recent proposition in the Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality opinion that remedies beyond compensation exist for some
successful takings claims. Sagarin v. City of Bloomington, 932 N.E.2d 739, 744-45 n.2 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2010).
98. 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
99. Id. at 564-65. See also San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d
1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing several "hotel conversion ordinances" enacted by the
City of San Francisco to "stop the depletion of housing for the poor, elderly and disabled").
100. Lambert, 67 Cal Rptr. 2d at 564 (discussing amendment of S.F. PLAN. CODE, §
178(a)(2) & (c) (1981)).
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replacement for those lost units or compensation to the city to mit-
igate a portion of the replacement costs.101
The City Planning Commission administers the Planning Code
and the Master Plan, while the Department of Building Inspection
administers the HUCDO.102 In acquiring two independent ap-
praisals and narrowly following the generally-applicable mitiga-
tion formula mandated by the HUCDO, the City's Department of
Building Inspection determined that Lambert's proposed replace-
ment of twenty-four of his residential units warranted a payment
of $600,000 in replacement costS.10 3 Lambert offered only
$100,000.104 Meanwhile, the City Planning Commission exercised
its discretionary authority by denying Lambert's application to
convert these twenty-four residential units into tourism units. 05
The Planning Commission's stated reasons for denying the appli-
cation included non-compliance with the Planning Code and the
Master Plan provisions regarding the preservation of an affordable
housing supply0 6 and neighborhood character,0 7 as well as those
aimed at preventing traffic congestion. 08
101. Id. at 564-65 (discussing S.F. ADMIN. CODE, § 41.13(a) (1990)).
102. See Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3 Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 562
(No. 99-967), 1999 WL 33632464.
103. See Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 570 (Strankman, J., dissenting) (citing government
replacement cost appraisals of $488,584 and $612,887). Some commentators question
whether such a fee structure actually could offset the lost affordable housing in light of the
extraordinary real estate escalation of the day in San Francisco. See, e.g., E-mail from Brian
Weeks, Deputy Public Advocate, State of N.J., to Timothy M. Mulvaney, Assoc. Professor of
Law, Tex. Wesleyan Univ. Sch. of Law (June 29, 2009) (on file with author). Mr. Weeks
authored a brief on behalf of the States of New Jersey, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia as amici curiae in support of
the respondents, the City and County of San Francisco, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City &
County of San Francisco. See Brief of the States of New Jersey, Colorado, Delaware, Ha-
waii, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma and West Virginia as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of the Respondents San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 543 U.S.
1032 (2005) (No. 04-340), 2005 WL 508086.
104. Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570 (Strankman, J., dissenting). While the Board of
Permit Appeals, in its review of the determination that the HUCDO applied to Lambert's
units, invited Lambert to acquire his own appraisal, he apparently did not. Id. at 571
(Strankman, J., dissenting). Since the City arrived at the $600,000 figure by inserting its
appraisal figures into a legislatively-mandated mitigation formula, Lambert's "offer" of
$100,000 could be considered irrelevant because there was no competing appraisal-or other
variable-for the parties to negotiate.
105. Id. at 563-64. Lambert argued that "[iut is clearly of no significance to property
owners which department or officer of the City demands an extortionary payment in
exchange for a discretionary permit ... and which one denies the permit when the demand
is not paid . . . ." Petitioners' Reply to Brief in Opposition at 3, Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 562
(No. 99-697) 1999 WL 33632465.
106. Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
107. Id. at 567.
108. Id. Unlike the City of Little Rock's denial at issue in Goss, the permit denial at
issue in Lambert did not cite the applicant's refusal to comply with a proposed exaction as a
reason for the denial. Id. Lambert suggested that the reasons stated in the Planning
Commission's permit denial amounted to "subterfuge," "pretense," and an "interagency shell
game." Petitioners' Reply to Brief in Opposition, at 3-4. The parties also disagreed on
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Lambert filed suit, alleging that the Planning Commission de-
nied the permit application because Lambert would not agree to
what he believed amounted to an extortionate demand in violation
of Nollan and Dolan.09 The appellate court refrained from con-
ducting a substantive review of any pre-permit-decision negotia-
tions between any City agency and Lambert under the heightened
exaction takings scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.n0 The court made
this decision based on the fact that the Planning Commission took
neither the $600,000 nor a permitted use from him."1 Instead, the
court conducted a rational basis review, ultimately concluding that
the reasons offered by the Planning Commission for denying the
permit application were reasonable.112
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Lambert's petition for certio-
rari.113 However, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, Justice
Scalia wrote, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari, that
"[t]here is no apparent reason why the phrasing of an extortionate
whether the Planning Commission determined that a mitigation fee of $600,000 would be
appropriate, or whether the Planning Commission or any other City agency bargained with
the Lambert's over the amount of any mitigation fee. These factual disputes, however, do
not detract from the discussion of Lambert for purposes of this Article's distinguishing
between proposed-versus-imposed exactions, for the Planning Commission also contended
that, even assuming that it had unsuccessfully attempted to impose the $600,000
replacement fee, the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is inapplicable. See
Respondent's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Lambert, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 562 (No. 99-697) 1999 WL 33632464.
109. See Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67.
110. Id. at 568-69.
111. Id. at 569. In dissent, Judge Strankman posited that the exaction must meet the
heightened scrutiny of the Nollan "essential nexus" test and the Dolan "rough
proportionality" test, as a "legitimate state interest[)" is not enough to "support unrelated
permit exactions." Id. at 571-72 (Strankman, J., dissenting) (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 & n.5 (1987)) (suggesting that such heightened scrutiny is
required to prevent "improper leveraging of the state's police power"). While disparate views
on the proportionality of an exacted fee to the impacts posed by Lambert's development
under the Dolan standard are conceivable, it is difficult to understand how a fee
contributing to replacing the housing stock lost via conversion would not bear an essential
nexus to the purposes of a regulation seeking to preserve the housing stock. Even if one
agrees that the access way parallel to the water in Nollan did not bear an "essential nexus"
to the scenic access way perpendicular to the water that the development restriction sought
to protect, the exaction of a housing supply mitigation fee, if conditioned upon a permit
issued to Lambert, seems the epitome of a proper exaction under the Nollan "essential
nexus" standard. Of course, in other situations, there may be a clear proportionality
between the proferred condition and the anticipated impact under Dolan, though Nollan
could instill taking liability fears in the regulating entity. Fenster, Constitutional Shadow,
supra note 4, at 747.
112. Lambert, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568. In other words, the California Court of Appeals
held that the Lamberts had no constitutional right to a permit for the land use change for
which they applied.
113. See Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 120 S. Ct. 1549 (2000) (denying
certiorari). The California Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in Lambert, but later
dismissed review as improvidently granted. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 6. However, as
one commentator notes, the California Supreme Court did not authorize republication of the
Court of Appeal's opinion, whereby there is "no published precedent in California to prevent
developers from seeking relief under this [proposed exaction] principle in the future." Id.
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demand as a condition precedent rather than as a condition subse-
quent should make a difference."1 14
Justice Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari is puzzling
for at least two reasons. First, despite the divergence between
the then-recent decision of the Eighth Circuit in Goss and the Cali-
fornia appellate court's decision in Lambert, Justice Scalia found
this case an exception to the Supreme Court's ordinary practice
against reviewing cases where there is no "conflict of authority
on the precise point[.]"" 5 Second, Justice Scalia invoked the
rationale from the Supreme Court's 1980 opinion in Agins v.
Tiburon by contending that an "unjustified denial can constitute
a taking[.]"11 6 That Justice Scalia later signed on to the unanimous
2005 opinion in Lingle v. Chevron holding that the Agins test
is inappropriate in takings analyses suggests that Justice Scalia
may have reconsidered the position he espoused five years earlier
in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lambert.117
Justice Scalia's dissent from the denial of certiorari-which, of
course, is not based upon full consideration of the merits and is not
binding on any court-also is far from unequivocal. He suggests
that "the subject of any proposed taking in the present case is far
from clear[,]"" 8 that there may be a "plausible" basis for distin-
guishing completed takings from proposed conditions that are nev-
er actually imposed,119 and that this temporal proposed-versus-
imposed distinction "raises a question that will doubtless be pre-
sented in many cases."120 However, the dissent from the denial of
certiorari does make one point abundantly clear. In City of Monte-
rey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,121 the Court just one year
prior to Lambert had unanimously stated that Dolan's rough pro-
portionality test "was not designed to address . .. questions arising
where . . . the landowner's challenge is based not on excessive ex-
114. Lambert, 120 S. Ct. at 1551 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari).
115. Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
116. Id. at 1551 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
117. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
118. See Lambert, 120 S. Ct. at 1551 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
119. Id. at 1551-52 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari). Indeed, to present a prima facie exaction takings claim, a claimant must identify
an exaction, and this exaction must amount to a taking of property that, if imposed in
isolation, would require compensation. Seen in this light, the Nollan and Dolan decisions
are in some ways quite narrow: even conditions that, if imposed in isolation, would amount
to a taking, are not considered takings if they are directly connected to, and roughly
proportionate with, the external concerns raised by the development application.
120. Id. at 1552 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., & Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
121. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
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actions but on denial of development."122 The dissent from the de-
nial of certiorari in Lambert makes evident that Justice Scalia and
two of his brethren that remain on the current Court agree that
this quoted language from Del Monte Dunes does not resolve the
proposed-versus-imposed exaction takings issue.123
In addressing the Koontz case, the three-member appellate
panel in Florida had only these very limited judicial annotations in
William J. Jones Insurance Trust, Goss, and Lambert to inform
their decision. Two of these three judges recently sided with the
conclusions of William J. Jones Insurance Trust and Goss, as well
as the pronouncements made by Justice Scalia in Lambert, in hold-
ing that the Nollan and Dolan tests are applicable not only to con-
ditions that actually are imposed, but also to conditions that mere-
ly are proposed.124 Applying the nexus and proportionality stand-
ards, the panel affirmed a trial court's deduction that the conser-
vation restriction self-proposed by Koontz was "enough" mitigation
for the wetlands destruction associated with Koontz's development
proposal.125 Therefore, the additional offsets suggested by the Dis-
trict at the pre-decisional stage amounted to an unconstitutional
exaction taking.126 The Florida court, however, departed from the
holdings in both William J. Jones Insurance Trust and Goss with
respect to the remedy. The Koontz panel awarded the prevailing
claimant compensation for the lost rent of his entire underlying
parcel and the permit that the District had originally denied.127
122. Id. at 703
123. However, the Koontz court asserted that the Dolan majority "implicitly rejected"
the argument that non-imposed conditions are not subject to the heightened "rough
proportionality" standard because Justice Stevens addressed the argument (and, in
actuality, misstated the underlying facts) in his Dolan dissent. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8, 11
(Fla. 5th DCA 2009). The Koontz court's assertion conflicts with traditional notions of
judicial review for many reasons. For instance, as a dissenting Judge explained, the court's
interpretation of Dolan would mean that Justice Scalia would have had no reason to dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Lambert. See id. at 20 (Griffin, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
were dissenting opinions afforded the authority to set binding precedent by raising an
innumerable amount of issues unaddressed in the majority opinion, the opposite of which
the majority must have implicitly agreed, it stands to reason that members of the judiciary
would clamor to be in the dissent rather than the majority in nearly every case.
124. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 12 n.4.
125. Id. at 12 n.5.
126. See id. Even if Nollan and Dolan are applicable to proposed conditions, under the
factual circumstances of Koontz it is difficult to imagine how replacing, improving, or
preserving wetlands does not bear an "essential nexus" to the impact of the development-
the loss of wetlands-that the regulation at issue sought to prevent. Nonetheless, without
explanation, the Florida trial court made that finding. Id. at 10.
127. Id. at 17 (Griffin, J., dissenting). "[R]emoval of the unconstitutional condition
cannot mean the applicant acquires the right to be free of any condition. Such a judicially-
invented notion might not do much harm on fourteen acres in the middle of rural central
Florida but in a thousand other contexts, it could be disastrous." Id. at 21 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting).
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B. Competing Interests in the Proposed-Versus-Imposed
Exaction Debate
William J. Jones Insurance Trust, Goss, Lambert, and Koontz
offer a brief glimpse into the contentious considerations in inter-
preting the temporal question of when the content of the theoreti-
cal, the spatial, and the stringency dimensions attach in the exac-
tion takings context. However, the conclusory and, at times, con-
tradictory nature of these cases provide little by way of a substan-
tive analysis of the competing interests at stake. The remainder of
this Part aims to fill this foundational gap.
1. Applying the Nollan and Dolan Construct to Proposed Exactions
At first glance, applying the same tests to all conceivable exac-
tions, whether they are proposed prior to an outright permit denial
or imposed in a final development approval, makes intuitive sense;
otherwise, the propensity for regulators to follow their worst rent-
seeking tendencies may be too great. This argument suggests that
property owners would be beholden to the government's extortion-
ate exaction propositions, lest they side with the empty alternative
of an absolute development prohibition.128 In the abstract, it may
sound illogical to require a property owner to accede to
extortionate demands before bringing suit to challenge those de-
mands as unconstitutional takings.129 Should the applicability
128. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (citing J.E.D. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584) (equating an exaction that lacks the requisite
nexus to governmental extortion); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P., 71
S.W.3d 18, 30 n.8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Alan Romero, Two Constitutional Theories
for Invalidating Extortionate Exactions, 78 NEB. L. REV. 348, 349 (1999)) ('"exactions may be
considered extortionate because the government uses the threat of denial to extract some
property interest from the owner, rather than simply trying to mitigate the negative public
effects from the proposed land use"'); J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12,
14 (N.H. 1981) (concluding that, absent proof by the Town of the need for the exaction, an
imposed condition was nothing short of "an out-and-out plan of extortion"). But see Fenster,
Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 651 ("In situations in which jurisdictions compete for
development and property owners may exit with relative ease or successfully engage in
political lobbying, the ... story of powerful, unchecked local governments is inaccurate and
unpersuasive."). One scholar has suggested that Nollan and Dolan are not concerned at all
with the right that is infringed; rather, they are focused solely on the behavior of
governmental entities. See Hanoch Dagan, Remarks at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.,
Association for Law, Property, and Society (Mar. 2011). However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the validity of government action is a due process inquiry that necessarily is
precedent to a takings analysis. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
129. See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 53, at 10104. A concurrence in Koontz suggests that
the government retains the right to consider pre-decisional offset proposals from applicants
free of the Nollan and Dolan strictures. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 15 (Orfinger, J.,
concurring). Nonetheless, apparently at least one property owner did assert a Dolan
challenge to a road dedication that he himself had offered. See KMST, L.L.C. v. Cnty. of
Ada, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (Idaho 2003).
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of Nollan and Dolan rest solely on how a given landowner reacts to
a proposed exaction?130
It may seem discomforting that an applicant who stands his
ground and refuses an inappropriate exaction would be penal-
ized-in that he could not avail himself of the nexus and propor-
tionality threshold that is more demanding of the government than
the alternative Penn Central balancing test applicable to ordinary
permit denials 131-but an applicant who succumbs to the exaction
demand could rely on the Nollan and Dolan tests. There is an in-
stinctive appeal to the argument that the denial of an application
based on refusal to comply with an exaction demanded by the gov-
ernment is indistinct from a permit conditioned on that exaction.
The government, this theory suggests, would be in a position to
threaten every applicant with an outright denial-which are rarely
challenged as successful takings under Penn Central-unless the
applicant consented to a particular exaction. And it is possible that
the applicant would be consenting to proceed with a project that is
economically infeasible or unmarketable with that exaction at-
tached. This arguably lends some support to the contention that
Nollan and Dolan's underlying premise is to protect against these
types of extortionate measures, whether they are presented as the
basis of a conditional permit or result in a permit denial.
2. Limiting Application of the Nollan and Dolan Construct
to Imposed Exactions
There are at least three reasons to suggest that the approach
offered in the preceding section may amount to an over-
simplification of, and an ultimately unsound resolution to, what
is in fact a complicated theoretical problem. First, where a
proposed exaction is refused or withdrawn, nothing actually has
been taken from the applicant. Second, judicial speculation on
hypothetical exactions and their hypothetical economic impacts
poses a wholly unmanageable system that could require courts to
review countless cases that do not present actual controversies.
Third, and arguably most importantly as a matter of legal policy,
burdening governmental entities with possible takings liability for
130. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 12 n.4. One amici of Koontz, in its brief to the Florida
Supreme Court, contends that the principles of Nollan and Dolan should apply with even
greater force where an applicant's refusal to accede to an unconstitutional condition results
in a denial. See Brief of Fla. Home Builders Ass'n & Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9-10, Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8 (SC09-713) 2010 WL 262547
("Using the classic gun-to-the-head metaphor for extortion, fatally pulling the trigger upon
refusal of the threatened party is more repugnant than a mere threat that succeeds in
coercing the victim.").
131. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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statements made during negotiation sessions will place a chilling
effect on regulator-landowner coordination. Each of these reasons
is taken up below.
First, once the government exercises its discretion to deny a
permit application, the applicant has the same development rights
that he had before he began the permitting process. Thus, he has
forfeited nothing that could be considered "taken."13 2 To pursue a
takings challenge, it seems elementary that some identifiable
property interest must be "taken" by a valid government action
before a court is able to determine if that government action vio-
lates the tests set forth in its "takings" jurisprudence. Then, only if
that governmental action violates the appropriate test, is just
compensation due.133 And if just compensation is due for the taking
of property, the public seemingly is entitled to obtain that property
for public use.134 If compensation were paid for a hypothetical ex-
action, there would be nothing for the public to obtain.
This is not to suggest that, if a governmental entity or official
performs an impermissible act, that entity or official is not subject
to a damages or equity suit on some legal theory for injuries
sustained. 35 However, the remedy for a taking is neither damages
132. See, e.g., Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8, 20 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting)
("[I]n what parallel legal universe or deep chamber of Wonderland's rabbit hole could there
be a right to just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth Amendment when
no property of any kind was ever taken by the government and none ever given up by the
owner?"). Property owners in the position of Mr. Koontz are not without recourse. They have
the ability to raise takings challenges to permit conditions, if they so choose, by obtaining
the permit with the government's proposed condition attached and then seeking
compensation under a traditional exaction claim in the trial court. In Florida, this procedure
is codified at FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2010). Still, it seems that the takings challenge would
pertain only to property allegedly taken, which in Koontz's case would presumably be the
money that the mitigating measures cost upon implementation. Property owners retain the
ability to challenge the substantive merit of a permit denial or the conditional grant of a
permit. In Florida, this substantive review can take place in an adjudicative proceeding
under FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (2010), or in the appellate division under FLA. STAT. § 120.68
(2010). See also Albrecht v. Florida, 444 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. 1984). However, in Koontz, the
property owner conceded that he had no entitlement to his proposed commercial
development. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 15-16 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., Covington v. Jefferson Cnty., 53 P.3d 828, 831 (Idaho 2002) (citing
Snyder v. Idaho, 438 P.2d 920, 924 (1968)) ("An inverse condemnation action cannot be
maintained unless an actual taking of private property is established.").
134. See Echeverria, Takings and Errors, supra note 51, at 1084-85 (noting the
"bilateral character" of the Takings Clause, in that property owners are entitled to just
compensation if their property is taken and "the public is entitled to the benefit of the
property it has purchased. . .").
135. The most probable constitutional basis for such a challenge is the Due Process
Clause. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (asserting that a due process violation supports a claim for economic
damages against federal officials). A tort suit also could serve as the basis for monetary
relief, while a claim for equitable relief might arise under federal or state administrative
rules. And, of course, if the government is indeed willing to issue the conditional permit, the
applicant always has the ability, as stated supra note 132, to accept that approval and file
suit seeking just compensation based on a takings theory.
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nor equity, so that legal theory cannot be based on the Takings
Clause. The only takings remedy is just compensation, which is
required by the Fifth Amendment only "for payment of an obliga-
tion lawfully incurred."36
Second, there are multiple reasons why a governmental entity
might deny a discretionary development permit. One preeminent
takings scholar suggests that it would be "foolish[ ]" for a govern-
mental entity to explicitly record that its denial is based upon a
proposed exaction that the applicant refused.137 However, so long
as the government notes the external effects of the proposed devel-
opment, it may not be material for takings purposes even if it did
state that its denial is based upon the applicant's refusal of a pro-
posed exaction. 38 That the proposed exaction was actually record-
ed in the denial seems inconsequential where the government al-
136. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 747 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also Echeverria, Takings and Errors, supra
note 51, at 1067 ("If a government action serves a public use if the legislature has
authorized it, it logically follows that an action which is not authorized by the legislature, or
which is contrary to legislative direction, cannot serve a public use" as required for a
taking). The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously supported the view expressed in Justice
Souter's dissenting opinion in Del Monte Dunes (and long espoused by Professor Echeverria)
in deciding Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). In Lingle, the Court held
that the validity of government action is a due process inquiry that necessarily is precedent
to a takings analysis, for "[n]o amount of compensation can authorize such action." Lingle,
544 U.S. at 543. While some might suggest that a claimant could waive a challenge to the
validity of the governmental act in order to proceed with a takings claim, Echeverria
poignantly has noted that such a theory is belied by the possibility of a third party
challenging the validity of that same act in a separate proceeding. See Echeverria, Takings
and Errors, supra note 51, at 1083-84.
137. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 640. See also Steven Eagle,
Remarks at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Association for Law, Property, and Society (March
2011) (suggesting that there may be a difficult evidentiary burden for plaintiffs challenging
an exaction that the government proposed where the government did not state that proffer
in writing when it ultimately denied the application).
138. But see Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 120 S. Ct 1549, 1550-51 (2000)
(denying certiorari) (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari) (suggesting that it would be relevant for the government's position if the government
ignored petitioners' refusal to satisfy the government's proposed exaction in ultimately
denying development approval). Justice Scalia chastised the lower court in Lambert for
"asserting that 'San Francisco did not demand anything' from petitioners, [but] in the next
breath [finding] it 'somewhat disturbing that San Francisco's concerns about congestion,
parking and preservation of a neighborhood might have been overcome by payment of [a]
significant sum of money."' Id. at 1550 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lambert v. City & Cnty.
of S.F., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)). Justice Scalia's assertion seems to
implicitly raise a Nollan question: if San Francisco's sole concern is, say, parking, then a fee
imposition for housing supply bears no nexus to that concern. However, in ultimately
denying Lambert's application to convert residential units to tourist units, San Francisco
voiced its concerns on the availability of housing stock. Id. at 1550 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J.,
Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Where there are multiple concerns
associated with a development application (e.g., parking, housing stock, traffic congestion,
etc.), an important issue is whether exactions should address each one of those concerns for
which the application would be denied. Taken to its logical end, Justice Scalia's assertion
counsels regulators to demand more exactions, not less. See, e.g., supra note 65 (suggesting
that only one of the concerns raised by the development application in Koontz would be
offset by the government's proposed exactions).
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ways maintained the authority to deny the permitl 39 and the iden-
tified proposed exaction was never imposed.140
Assuming the government did have the authority to deny the
permit application outright, is a court to review all of the listed
government-proposed exactions and declare that, say, the self-
proposed offer by the applicant (for example, in Koontz, the self-
proposed conservation restriction,141 or, in Lambert, the self-
proposed $100,000 impact fee' 4 2) was "enough" and the others are
invalid?143 This would mark an unprecedented and ceaseless judi-
cial intrusion into what are traditionally considered substantive
local land use control issues.144
Ordinarily, the validity of the governmental action is a precon-
dition to any successful regulatory takings claim. 45 Moreover, suc-
cessful takings claims ordinarily arise only where the economic
impact of that valid regulatory act is significant. Yet Nollan and
Dolan admittedly-and rather peculiarly-authorize courts to as-
sess the validity of an exaction and to find takings in instances
where the economic impact of the exaction is quite modest.146 But
139. In other words, the approval was "not part of [the applicant's] title to begin with."
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (footnote omitted).
140. If there were no such concern of an external impact, then the substantive validity
of any government action prohibiting development could be called into question as
erroneous and violative of the applicant's due process rights. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542. If
there were a concern of an external impact but the government chose not to consider an
exaction to offset it, current exaction takings law seemingly places no limits on such gov-
ernmental inaction, despite the ill-effects suffered by the neighbors and nearby residents of
the development site. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Address at Gonzaga Univ. Sch. of Law,
Faculty Seminar, Where the Wild Things Aren't: Transposing Exaction Takings (Sept. 30,
2010).
141. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d 8, 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
142. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 570 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (Strankman, J., dissenting).
143. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 12 and n.5 (affirming a trial court conclusion that a
conservation restriction self-proposed by the applicant was "enough" mitigation for the
wetlands destruction associated with the applicant's development proposal, such that the
exactions proposed by the government necessarily amounted to an exaction taking).
144. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 7 (suggesting that judicial acceptance of a theory
of proposed exaction takings "could serve as a potent weapon for developers" by requiring
courts to "subject all manner of permit denials to heightened scrutiny").
145. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962). See also
Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1 ("Like other forms of social and economic regulation, land use
regulation has traditionally enjoyed a presumption of validity.").
146. It is true that tension continues to exist in delineating due process and takings
analyses in the exactions context. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, a
unanimous 2005 opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a previously espoused takings
test that probed into the validity of the government action, suggesting that such tests
instead sound in due process. Id. at 540-43. The Lingle Court confirmed that regulatory
takings inquiries center on the economic impact that a governmental action has upon an
individual's property value. Id. at 538-40. The exaction takings tests of Nollan and Dolan
seemingly required application of the very substantive analysis rejected in Lingle because
exactions that result in takings are invalid in the sense that they violate the means-ends
nexus and proportionality threshold. Nevertheless, Lingle perplexingly preserved Nollan
and Dolan's tests in the "special context" of exactions. Id. at 538, 548.
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even with the peculiar inquiry into the substantive validity of ex-
actions required by Nollan and Dolan, it is a far stretch to suggest
from this peculiarity that courts are to engage in mass speculation
in cases where no exaction is imposed and there is therefore no
economic impact that can be examined.
The Koontz facts are illustrative of this point. If the theoretical,
spatial, and stringency features of property attached at the
mere proposal of an exaction, a thorough judicial analysis in a case
like Koontz would include determining the validity of (1) the pro-
posed offsite mitigation on all of the potential offsite mitigation
sites, (2) all equivalent hypothetical mitigating measures that the
applicant conceivably otherwise could have offered, and (3) the re-
duction in the development footprint, to determine whether any of
these possibilities-if they ever were actually imposed-would
have crossed the Nollan and Dolan threshold.147 Such a multi-
layered exercise in speculation seems far outside the bounds of the
judicial branch's role.
Requiring courts to predict the exactions a permitting agency
might have chosen had it issued a conditional permit, and to as-
sess the hypothetical economic impact that those hypothetical ex-
actions might have amounted to, blurs the very distinction be-
tween the courts and the political branches. As the U.S. Supreme
Court has noted, "[a] court cannot determine whether a regulation
has gone 'too far' [so as to require the payment of just compensa-
tion] unless it knows how far the regulation goes."148 And even if
such a speculative review were proper and a court determined that
all of the reviewed exactions violate Nollan and Dolan, it seems
appropriate that the regulating entity should have the ability to
choose among the assuredly many other conditions that would be
"enough" to offset the development's external effects.149
147. While the Koontz trial court apparently focused exclusively on the government's
offsite mitigation proposition (which could occur on a number of sites), the government
agency had also presented the property owner with the options of proposing any equivalent
mitigating measure within the Basin or reducing the size of his development, which would
not have required any mitigation. Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 16 (Griffin, J., dissenting). The
Koontz appellate court apparently did not take issue with the trial court's failure to
undertake an analysis of each possibility. See id. at 12 n.5 (stating that "the trial court
decided as fact that the conservation easement offered by Mr. Koontz was enough and that
any more would exceed the rough proportionality threshold, whether in the form of off-site
mitigation or a greater easement dedication for conservation") (emphasis added).
148. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986) (quoting
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
149. In both William J. Jones Ins. Trust and Koontz, the court not only mandated the
issuance of a permit in light of a takings finding, but also determined the terms of that
permit. See supra notes 91 & 127 and accompanying text. But see Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 21
(Griffin, J., dissenting) ("Surely, even the most extreme view that conditions imposed on the
issuance of a permit constitute an 'out and out plan of extortion' would, nevertheless,
recognize that removal of the unconstitutional condition cannot mean the applicant acquires
the right to be free of any condition."). The lack of any definitive, discretionary agency
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Third, while it may be the case that the government is required
in some circumstances to pay temporary takings compensation for
the period of time during which an unconstitutional exaction con-
strains a landowner's economic use of her property,150 proposed
conditions in instances where the government could have denied
the development permit outright rarely if ever constrain a land-
owner's justified expectations regarding the property's economic
uses. Establishing a rule requiring temporary takings liability for
proposed conditions would place a momentous chilling effect on
cooperative negotiation between regulators and landowners to ad-
vance collective land use objectives. (These objectives include, for
example, promoting traffic safety and accommodation as in Wil-
liam J. Jones Insurance Trust'5 and Goss,152 assuring an adequate
housing supply as in Lambert,153 and protecting vulnerable wet-
lands as in Koontz.154)
decision on which condition(s) might or might not have been imposed can be analogized to
the longstanding tenet that a takings claim is not reviewable unless it is ripe. See, e.g.,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001) ("Under our ripeness rules a takings
claim based on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in burdening property
depends upon the landowner's first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow
regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion. . . ."). However, in an earlier opinion in
the Koontz litigation, a Floridian appellate panel overturned the trial court's dismissal of
Koontz's takings claim by rejecting the government's ripeness defense, holding that Koontz
need not continue negotiating with the government until it approves an offer before filing a
takings claim. See Koontz III, 720 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
150. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 321 (1987) (establishing landowner's right to "compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective.").
151. William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912, 914 (W.D. Ark.
1990).
152. Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1998).
153. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
154. See Koontz IV, 5 So. 3d at 10. Dissenting in Koontz, one judge stated that "filt will
be too risky for a governmental agency to make offers for conditional permit approvals or to
offer a trade of benefits out of fear that the offer might be rejected and the condition later
found to have lacked adequate nexus or proportionality." Id. at 21 (Griffin, J., dissenting). In
light of the risk identified by this dissenting judge, property owners ultimately may suffer.
Regulators might choose the risk-averse option of simply denying more permit applications,
whereby they would face only the more deferential, ad hoc balancing test of Penn Central in
any takings challenge. See Dana, supra note 4, at 1298; Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction
Takings, supra note 4, at 214-16. In some jurisdictions, pre-construction acquiescence to a
development condition apparently does not always foreclose the possibility of the
developer-even after construction has commenced-challenging that condition as
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Sarasota Cnty. v. Taylor Woodrow Homes Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1247,
1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that the property owner is entitled to apply current (1995)
constitutional law to an alleged taking which occurred in 1974 after a contractual
concession was acceded without protest); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 877 P.2d 187, 195
(Wash. 1994) (dismissing post-construction challenge to development impact fee on statute
of limitations grounds). But see, e.g., Wolverton Assocs. v. Official Creditors' Comm., 909
F.2d 1286, 1297 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Cnty. of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14
(1977)) (holding that "enjoyment of the benefits of a conditional use permit bars a landowner
or his successor in interest from challenging any conditions that the permit requires");
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Yet if all permit application denials that followed some level of
failed negotiations were subject to the Supreme Court's exaction
takings framework based on even one exaction mentioned by the
government during those negotiations, governmental officials
would be forced into uncommunicative rejections or unconditioned
approvals of development applications when a more amenable
compromise may have been available. 155 The potential mutual ad-
vantages of growth development and resource protection emanat-
ing from the ordinarily fluid negotiating process between appli-
cants and governmental staff persons would be compromised, as
the next Part discusses in more detail.156
IV. THE IMPACT OF SUBJECTING PROPOSED EXACTIONS TO THE
EXACTION TAKINGS CONSTRUCT AT THE WATER'S EDGE
This Part considers the limitations that subjecting proposed
exactions to a Nollan and Dolan analysis could have at the water's
edge in light of the regulatory focus of this journal volume: the
phenomenon of sea level rise. While denying all discretionary de-
velopment applications in the coastal zone may be the most pru-
dent response to pending sea level rise, this is unlikely a financial-
ly and politically practical choice in many jurisdictions. 15 7 The
competing interests of growth development on one hand and
the protection of public health and environmental resources on
the other necessarily demand that regulatory bodies engage in
a balancing analysis. Therefore, though development may be
strictly prohibited in identified retreat areas in certain jurisdic-
tions, this Part assumes that some development will continue in
Rossco Holdings, Inc. v. State, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (landowner
corporation forfeited its inverse condemnation claim by complying with permit conditions).
155. For literature suggesting that, even where applied to imposed exactions, Nollan
and Dolan encourage such results, see, for example, Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra
note 1, at 652-65; Mulvaney, Remnants of Exaction Takings, supra note 4, at 214-15.
156. See, e.g., Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 4, at 741 (contending that
exactions "play a crucial regulatory and ideological role in bringing flexibility to an
otherwise inflexible process, ameliorating the negative consequences of controversial new
development proposals while persuading political opposition to accept them").
157. See, e.g., CSA INT'L, INC., SEA LEVEL RISE RESPONSE STRATEGY WORCESTER
COUNTY, MARYLAND 1-3, 2-7, 3-14 & 3-28 (2008), available at http://landuse.law.pace.edu/
landuse/documents/laws/reg3/WorcesterCntyMDPlanning08.pdf (noting that in Worcester
County, Maryland, only 5% of the residential parcels projected to be inundated by 2100
under the "worst case scenario" of a 1.47 meter sea level rise are in areas designated for
conservation, while the remainder is available for possible development, and suggesting
that adopting retreat "as the only response strategy ... would be improbable" in light of
short term costs, including the "massive cut in property tax revenues," and the "extremely
politically unfavorable" nature of making the "drastic decision[]" to restrict public
investment.).
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areas of accommodation that nonetheless are vulnerable to the ef-
fects of sea level rise. 158
A. Discouraging Pre-Decisional Interaction Between
Landowners and Regulators
Pre-decisional meetings between regulators and applicants are
quite common in the course of the balancing analysis in areas
where at least some development will be accommodated. Indeed, it
is difficult to conceive of a realistic development application that
would not trigger pre-decision discussions between the regulator
and the applicant. Yet subjecting an exaction to a takings chal-
lenge under Nollan and Dolan at the moment it is proposed in a
negotiating session could foreclose, for all intents and purposes,
the possibility of such a session ever taking place.
A permitting official's fear of encumbering his or her agency
with an exaction taking at the pre-decisional stage could expose
the "landowner to the treadmill effect of repeated denials without
any indication from governmental agencies of changes in [the
landowner's] proposal that would permit an economically benefi-
cial use of his property."'59 Conversely, these fears could result in
the equally socially detrimental result of the government's confer-
ring unconditional approvals-i.e., waiving its regulatory respon-
sibility-for projects with negative community impacts.160 Ironical-
ly, the very exaction system that was created to bring about an
158. Within these accommodation areas, this Part focuses on exactions that are
attached to development approvals on an ad hoc basis, as opposed to exactions mandated by
generally applicable legislation. However, to the extent legislation creates a formula or
schedule for the imposition of exactions that retains some discretionary role for regulators
in individual cases, this Part is also relevant. For a discussion of the distinction between
adjudicative and legislative exactions for takings purposes, see supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text.
159. Estuary Props., Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) rev'd on
other grounds sub. nom. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
See also UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 12, at 156; Jonathan M. Davidson et al., 'Where's
Dolan?'" Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 697 (1998) (suggesting Nollan and
Dolan create a "chilling effect" on local governments' use of exactions); Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note 1, at 665 (suggesting that, in risk-averse jurisdictions with the
political will to deny development permits outright, "the property owner is significantly
worse off than if she could bargain freely with the local government over conditions that
might win an approval").
160. These waivers predictably would confer an unfair windfall on particular property
owners at the public's expense. Third-party suits to challenge such waivers have faced
mixed results. Compare Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 758 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(rejecting neighbor challenge to county's waiver of road widening and improvement
requirements for fear that imposing the requirement might violate Dolan's proportionality
threshold), with McAllister v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 384 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (concluding that the record did not support the Coastal Commission's defense of its
issuance of a permit allowing erection of a house in an environmentally sensitive area on
the ground that failure to issue the permit would have been a compensable taking).
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outcome serving the interests of all parties would often have pre-
cisely the opposite effect. From a normative perspective, it is un-
likely that such absolutism-making final decisions on discretion-
ary permits without attempting to find a negotiated solution ame-
nable to all parties-is what a large contingency of society de-
mands of its government officials.161
B. Lost Benefits on the Coast
The lost benefits of regulator-landowner negotiations could
be particularly acute for the nation's coastlines, where municipali-
ties are in the midst of a complex effort to respond to sea level rise.
This acuteness can be attributed in part to the fact that
the potential impacts associated with coastal land use intensifica-
tion in the face of rising sea levels are particularly wide-ranging.
These impacts include, but certainly are not limited to, erosion of
beaches, heightened coastal flooding, increased public health and
safety risks, and damaged public infrastructure. 1 62 But even more
significant for exaction takings purposes than the
diversity of the impacts, this acuteness can also be attributed to
the fact that the magnitude of these impacts is quite difficult to
forecast with any precision.
The rapid and continuing development of advanced scientific
tools to predict and measure these threats makes fashioning re-
sponsive measures an exceptionally fluid exercise in coastal areas.
Exactions that have been employed in the past in an effort to re-
spond to such impacts include both retreat measures-such as set-
back provisions, conservation easements, rolling easements, and
development elevation-and defensive measures-such as shore-
line enhancement requirements, armoring (e.g., bulkheads, sea-
walls, retaining structures, revetments, dikes, tide gates, storm
surge barriers, etc.), and land surface elevation. Yet both regula-
tors and landowners are continually exploring new, creative solu-
161. See Fennell, supra note 4, at 5 (contending that both Nollan and Dolan block what
could be mutually beneficial dealings between local governments and developers); Fenster,
Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 675-78 (same).
162. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local
Communities Imperative for Achieving Sustainability, 4 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 256,
289 (2009); Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise,
Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 534
(2007); David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate
Change Litigation,155 U. PA. L. REV.1741, 1763 (2007); Marc R. Poirier, A Very Clear Blue
Line: Behavioral Economics, Public Choice, Public Art and Sea Level Rise, 16 S.E. ENVTL.
L.J. 83, 85-93 (2007); James G. Titus, Does the U.S. Government Realize that the Sea is
Rising? How to Restructure Federal Programs so that Wetlands and Beaches Survive, 30
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 717, 725-33 (2000); Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems,
Decisionmaking, and the Science of Earth's Systems: Procedural Missing Links, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1077, 1088-89 (2001).
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tions to a natural phenomenon that they still do not fully under-
stand. It would seem quite prudent for each party to at least con-
sider and discuss any innovative remediative or restorative pro-
posals offered by the other party, in light of the often varied sets of
experiences and perspectives on both sides. The dynamism of the
boundary between land and water, and the unique nature of any
particular parcel at or near that boundary, calls for a flexible, evo-
lutionary, and, where possible, collaborative approach.163
A system that encourages regulators and applicant landowners
to convene at the pre-decisional stage offers the possibility of de-
veloping what Mark Fenster refers to as "site- and dispute-specific
terms of compromise[,]" which have advantages for both the land-
owner and the community members (and resources) that regula-
tors are charged with protecting.164 Exactions can enable responsi-
ble growth and enlarge local economies, 65 while simultaneously
promoting the efficient use of infrastructure and protection of the
environment by assuring that developers and their customers con-
tribute their cost-share of the infrastructural or environmental re-
sources they are anticipated to utilize or impair.166
Fenster does not doubt that, at times, these attempts at coor-
dination can be "quite messy."167 However, he argues persuasively
that the very legitimacy and effectiveness of the local government
model demands such debate within the political system.168 This
potential for delegitimization stems from at least two sources.
First, the manifestation of pre-decisional exaction takings fears
squanders the expertise of the engineers and environmental scien-
tists employed to assess development projects' impacts and to iden-
tify alternative or provisional ways in which such a project could
proceed. Second, and more broadly, the loss of attempts at a collec-
tive resolution can damage confidence in the social processes that
are essential to the very functionality of local governance.169
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168. Id. at 668-78.
169. See, e.g., Poirier, Virtue of Vagueness, supra note 36, at 190-91 (discussing the
essential nature of collective processes); Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 1, at 673;
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9





In Nollan and Dolan and their exaction takings progeny,
the judiciary has presented multiple and conflicting theories of
property rights; has only alluded to the spatial characteristics of
the property interest subject to those theories; and has addressed
how stringently those interests will be protected by establishing
the elusive "nexus" and "proportionality" tests. Yet despite this
overall lack of absolute clarity on the relevant property interest's
theoretical, spatial, and stringency features, it is property's
temporal characteristics that appear to be the most perplexing
and unsettled within exaction takings law. In focusing on the tem-
poral features of the property interest at stake, this Article ex-
plores whether the takings construct ordinarily applied when an
exaction is imposed is also applicable at the point in time when an
exaction is merely proposed.
The piece offers three reasons to suggest that only upon the
imposition of an exaction should the existing exaction takings
construct attach as to any particular claimant. First, where a
proposed exaction is refused or withdrawn, no property has been
taken. Second, judicial speculation on the substantive worth of
hypothetical exactions suggests such matters are not suitable for
review. Third, burdening governmental entities with possible
takings liability for statements made during negotiation sessions
places a chilling effect on regulator-landowner coordination.
The last of these three is likely the most significant from a
legal policy perspective, particularly on the nation's coastlines,
where such coordination can be especially useful in light of the
uncertainties surrounding the extent of and impacts associated
with sea level rise.
The lack of reasoned judicial guidance on issues of temporality
in exaction takings law is hindering the ultimate employment of
an important regulatory tool for local governments. Until the pro-
posed-versus-imposed question is appropriately resolved, the dis-
cretionary governmental power to condition development approv-
als-particularly as a tool to adapt to a complex, developing phe-
nomenon such as sea level rise-will continue to raise indetermi-
nate and unnecessary takings liability risks.
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